What happens at 74%?

Status: Draft worked example · Last reviewed: 12 October 2026

The proposed 75% threshold aims to bring more MPs into meaningful debate and give them a chance to improve a bill. It is easy to say and hard to apply. This fictional housing bill shows the decisions the rule would force. It is a stress test for an idea, not a description of current law or a promise that this exact process has been settled.

A housing bill reaches Parliament

Imagine a bill that would help councils finance water and transport infrastructure needed for new homes. Its sponsors publish the full draft, a cost estimate, who would pay, expected housing effects, and the risks to ratepayers and public debt. They invite other parties to change the draft before it is introduced.

After introduction, a select committee calls for public submissions. Renters, homeowners, councils, builders, mana whenua, and other affected people can put evidence on the record. The committee tests the numbers, recommends changes, and reports areas of agreement and disagreement. This builds on Parliament's existing select-committee process.

The final vote is 74%

Under our proposed rule, the bill does not pass at this vote. Support from 74% of all MPs is below the required 75%; rounding or abstentions cannot turn it into a law. The vote and each party's reasons should be public. The existing law remains in place.

The sponsors could then publish a revised draft that addresses the objections, with an updated cost and impact assessment. A cross-party group would have a defined period to negotiate and invite focused public feedback. The parties might trade support for changes to the funding split, infrastructure timing, or protections for affected communities. Before another vote, they should publish those concessions, the revised costs, who gains and pays, and any unresolved differences. A substantial new provision should return for public scrutiny. People could then judge whether the bargain improved the bill. The House would vote again on the revised bill.

If that vote also falls short, a major long-term proposal could go to the 100-person people's forum once. Its members would hear the competing cases and recommend a way forward. MPs would publish a response to each recommendation, then hold a final vote. The forum would advise Parliament, not pass the bill.

The limit would apply to rounds of delay, not to MPs' votes. Every MP could still vote no at every stage. This model allows one structured redraft and, for a qualifying major issue, one forum review before the final parliamentary decision. The criteria for using a forum, its cost, and the time allowed for each stage need to be settled publicly.

If the final vote still falls short

Our working escape route would allow the same final text to pass if at least two-thirds of all MPs support it in two successive Parliaments, with a general election between the votes. The final vote in the first Parliament would count as the first of those two votes only if it reached two-thirds. A material change to the text would restart that two-vote route. If support falls below two-thirds after the election, the proposal lapses. A simple majority in one Parliament would never be enough for this route.

This is a proposed safeguard to test, not current New Zealand law. It trades some of the 75% single-Parliament requirement for sustained support across an election. Sweden uses an election between two decisions on constitutional amendments; the two-thirds requirement here is our suggested design, not Sweden's rule. We would need constitutional advice on the exact legal mechanism and public debate on whether two-thirds twice is a strong enough mandate.

Working safeguards to test

These are possible rules for debate, because a 75% threshold for every law could stop essential government business:

Each safeguard narrows the proposed 75% starting rule. These exceptions would have to be defined before anyone could judge a final model. A public debate could also consider a referendum route for exceptional, long-running deadlocks, but it should not be an automatic shortcut around Parliament.

The test for this idea

Could a system like this improve the quality and durability of laws without giving a small bloc a permanent veto? We would want evidence from worked examples across housing, health, tax, budgets, and emergencies before recommending a final rule. How Parliament currently votes

See how we assess every idea · Explore the broader governance proposals