A better way to govern
If you're elected, work together as adults to make the country better. That is the standard we want for every MP, whether their party forms a government or not. We want people to choose long-term waypoints together, then expect representatives to make steady progress, test results, and explain a change of course. Debate should improve the route and help the country keep moving after every election.
Political point-scoring consumes time that could go into solving problems. The country needs ideas, energy, and people willing to work with others beyond their usual side. Inclusion means inviting those affected by a proposal into the work early, listening when they disagree, and explaining how their input changed the outcome.
Our parliamentary traditions grew out of an older Westminster system. New Zealand no longer has an upper house, and MMP gives us a multi-party Parliament. Our ways of working should reflect that reality. New Zealand Parliament's history of the House
A job for every MP
Every MP should be expected to contribute, whether their party is in government or opposition. Opposition is essential for scrutiny and accountability. It should also have a meaningful opportunity to improve legislation, rather than being confined to criticism after decisions have already been made.
Strong disagreement can reveal a flaw or a better route. MPs should challenge proposals with evidence and offer improvements that others can test. Their responsibility to the country continues after the debate ends.
A 51–49 split may be enough to win a vote under today's rules. It should not mean one side writes the plan while everyone else can only criticise a finished bill. MPs outside government already scrutinise legislation, propose changes, and serve on select committees. We want governments to involve them earlier and take good improvements seriously.
We would start with earlier cross-party work on major proposals, serious consideration of select-committee evidence, and public explanations of where parties agree and where they still differ. Parliament's select committees already provide a place where members work across party lines; we want to build on that practice. How select committees work
People outside Parliament should have a structured way to examine the hardest choices too. Our proposed people's forum would bring 100 randomly selected members together to hear evidence, discuss policy, vote on recommendations, and receive a public response from elected decision-makers.
Make influence visible
People and organisations should be able to make their case to government. The public should also be able to see who has access to decision-makers and what resources are behind that access.
We propose a mandatory, searchable public register of professional lobbying. Paid lobbyists, and organisations employing people to lobby on their behalf, would disclose:
- Who: the lobbyist, their employer or client, and the organisation ultimately funding the work.
- Who they contacted: the Minister, MP, political staff member, or senior public official involved, with the date and subject of each substantial contact, including online and unscheduled meetings.
- What they sought: the law, policy, contract, grant, or government decision they wanted to influence, plus any written material they supplied.
- What money was involved: quarterly amounts spent by client and issue, including lobbying fees, paid campaigns, gifts, hospitality, and other benefits. Political donations would be linked where relevant, but reported under their own election-law rules.
Both the lobbyist and the public office should be responsible for confirming the contact. Records should be published promptly in a format people can search and download, with independent checks and consequences for repeated or deliberate non-disclosure.
An ordinary person writing to their MP about a personal problem, a public submission, or a confidential whistleblower should not have to register as a lobbyist. Any information withheld to protect privacy or security should have a stated reason and independent review.
The reporting threshold, publication deadlines, enforcement body, and cost of running the register still need to be designed. The rules should capture meaningful paid influence without making routine public contact with MPs harder.
New Zealand already publishes some Ministerial diaries, MPs' declared interests, and party donation information. These are separate records with different coverage. The Ministry of Justice has consulted on a voluntary lobbying code and is assessing options for regulation. Ministry of Justice: political lobbying
A higher bar for making law
Our proposed starting rule is support from 75% of all MPs to pass or change a law. Today, most decisions in the House require a simple majority of votes cast. We do not think a bare majority provides a strong enough mandate to change the law. The 75% goal asks more MPs to take part in shaping a bill, debate it seriously, and build an agreement that more of the country can stand behind. It measures support among MPs, not among voters; it would not mean 75% of New Zealanders endorsed a bill. How Parliament votes
Narrow rules for annual funding, genuine emergencies, and prolonged deadlock remain open for debate. Our 74% worked example shows the draft options and their risks. We would settle those rules in public before asking anyone to support a final model.
The number alone would not achieve that purpose. Major bills should be shared early, with time for cross-party amendments and public submissions. Their sponsors should publish the evidence, changes made after debate, and reasons for rejecting substantial objections. People should be able to see how the wider agreement was built.
Reaching 75% would involve negotiation and trade-offs. A party may support a bill after securing a change that improves it for people it represents. Before the final vote, the parties should publish the agreement: what each sought, what changed, who benefits, who bears the cost, and how the full package will be funded. Material new provisions should face public scrutiny. Deals on unrelated appointments, spending, or laws should be examined separately so the public can judge each decision on its merits. Our lobbying proposal would also show outside interests trying to shape the bargain.
There is also a narrower Nordic example. Sweden allows the main provisions of its Riksdag Act, which governs Parliament's organisation and work, to be changed in one decision with at least three-quarters of votes cast and more than half of all members; the alternative is two decisions with an election between them. Ordinary Swedish laws pass by a majority of members voting. Norway requires two-thirds for constitutional amendments. These rules protect particular parts of a system rather than requiring 75% for every ordinary law. Sweden's constitutional rules · Sweden's ordinary law-making · Norwegian constitutional amendments
A 75% rule could also give a minority the power to block necessary action, including the repeal of a harmful law, or push negotiations out of public view. Before adopting it, we would need to settle how it applies to budgets, emergencies, repeals, and routine changes, and how to prevent deadlock. Building consensus must never mean removing the ability to govern or weakening democratic scrutiny.
Our working deadlock model would limit repeated rounds of delay while preserving every MP's right to vote no. After a failed vote, sponsors would get one defined period to revise the bill in public. A major unresolved issue could go once to a people's forum before a final vote. We would also test an alternative route requiring two-thirds of all MPs to support the same text before and after an election. These are draft safeguards, and their scope and legal design need scrutiny.
See what happens when a fictional housing bill gets 74% support.
A higher bar for major public spending
We also propose 75% support from all MPs before the government makes a defined major new financial commitment, including a qualifying project or long-term contract that does not need its own new law. Parliament already authorises public spending through appropriations, while Ministers and Cabinet make many investment decisions within that authority. This proposal would add a specific parliamentary decision before the largest commitments become binding. The Treasury's guide to public finance · Cabinet investment approvals
The test for what counts as major is not yet settled. It should consider whole-of-life cost, the size and duration of the liability, exit costs, and effects on nationally important services. It should cover qualifying taxpayer-backed commitments made through Crown entities as well as departments, and stop a large programme being split into smaller approvals to avoid scrutiny. Funding existing services each year would continue through the annual Budget; a qualifying new commitment should receive its own public vote.
Before that vote, MPs and the public should see an independently tested business case, the alternatives, funding and lifetime costs, and what would happen if the project were delayed or cancelled. Commercially sensitive detail would need a protected route for scrutiny, with as much of the decision published as possible. If support falls short, the government could revise the plan and seek another vote; it could not sign the qualifying commitment under this proposed rule. The threshold, legal mechanism, timetable, and any genuine emergency exception need public design. How we propose to assess major projects
There is a limited company-law parallel. A company must obtain a special shareholder resolution before a major transaction, generally one worth more than half the value of its assets. A special resolution needs at least 75% of votes cast by eligible shareholders, which differs from 75% of all MPs. Ordinary shareholder decisions can pass by a simple majority. This shows that some large commitments warrant a higher bar; it does not establish the right voting rule for government. Companies Act 1993, sections 2, 105–106 and 129
A longer horizon
Housing, infrastructure, education, and environmental repair need plans measured in decades. We want the public, communities affected by decisions, and parties across Parliament to help set goals at least ten years ahead. Each goal should have visible milestones, costs, and measures of progress. Future governments should be able to improve the route while explaining why they changed it.
Our working proposal is a four-year maximum parliamentary term so elected representatives have more time to deliver and evaluate that work while voters still get a regular chance to change course. Parliament currently has a maximum term of three years. Changing that limit would require either support from 75% of all MPs or approval at a referendum, because the term of Parliament is a protected part of electoral law. A longer term must come with stronger public reporting and scrutiny between elections. Electoral Act 1993, section 268
Parliament introduced a four-year-term bill in 2025. Our proposal should be judged alongside that work, with particular attention to the annual reports and midpoint scrutiny needed between elections.
Parties should name a limited set of priority commitments before an election, then report publicly on their progress and the evidence behind it every year. See the proposed accountability checks.
Major infrastructure should have a durable service goal and early cross-party scrutiny. Before cancelling a committed project, a government should publish the cost and consequences of continuing, changing, and stopping it. The Cook Strait ferry example shows why this matters.
Limits on time in office
Longer parliamentary terms should not mean unlimited time in power. Our draft proposal is a maximum of three elected terms as an MP and two terms as Prime Minister. Public office should be a period of service, not a career that depends on staying in Parliament indefinitely. We want people with ideas, experience from different walks of life, and the drive to help shape a better future to actively take part.
Adults should be able to bring those ideas to Parliament at any stage of life and be judged by voters on their work and plans.
Turnover can bring fresh thinking, but Parliament must also retain what it learns. New MPs need strong induction, capable support, and access to the evidence and lessons from earlier decisions.
The rules would need to say how partial terms, early elections, and a change of Prime Minister during a parliamentary term are counted. They would also need to preserve the House's ability to choose a government that has its confidence.
See how these changes could happen · Read the rights and trade-offs · Help test and improve these ideas